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A Record of What?
The Proper Scope of an Administrative
Record for Informal Agency Action
Peter Constable Alter*
Recent cases involving controversial actions taken by federal agencies under the Trump
Administration have highlighted a preliminary procedural nuance unique to litigation under
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA): the “administrative record.” The APA
provides for liberal judicial review of federal agency actions, but limits that review to the “whole
record, or those parts of it cited by a party.” This “record rule” limits judicial review to the
“administrative record” before the agency when it made the decision at issue. The APA defines
the administrative record for agency action subject to its formal procedural requirements, but
leaves open the question of what an administrative record consists of for informal agency action
not subject to those procedural requirements but nevertheless subject to judicial review.
Lower courts, without definitive statutory text, legislative history, or Supreme Court
precedent for guidance, have developed a divergent and sometimes inconsistent body of case law
addressing the proper scope of an administrative record for informal agency action. The
traditional approach generally would focus on those materials directly considered by the agency
decisionmaker alone while categorically excluding most, if not all, internal documents. But
more recently, some lower courts have begun to apply an expansive construction of the record
rule, requiring agencies subject to litigation to submit any material considered by agency
personnel involved in the decision-making process, including an array of internal materials.
Two recent cases, involving the Department of Homeland Security’s attempted revocation of
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and Secretary of Commerce
Wilbur Ross’s attempts to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Department of Commerce,
illustrate the wider movement towards an expansive construction of the record rule for informal
agency action.
In this Note, I argue that the expansive approach to the record rule for informal agency
action becoming popular in some lower courts is correct, both in terms of the judicial review
provisions of the APA it serves and the principles of administrative law the APA furthers.
*
J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law, 2019. Many thanks to the editors and
executive board of the UC Irvine Law Review for their diligent work, to Professor Shauhin Talesh and
my colleagues in the Advanced Writing for Law Journals workshop for their thoughtful feedback, and
to Professor Michael Robinson-Dorn for never failing to indulge a conversation about
administrative law.
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The broader adoption of an expansive approach to the record rule has implications for any
area of law touched by federal agencies. Indeed, as the DACA and 2020 Census litigation
demonstrate, the composition of an administrative record can have significant consequences for
issues of national importance.
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INTRODUCTION
The Trump Administration is no stranger to controversies. Many of these
controversies, indeed some of the most contentious, involve the actions of
Trump-appointed Officials in federal agencies. The Administration’s decisions to
rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and add a
question about citizenship to the 2020 Census are two of the most noteworthy
examples, which various stakeholders have since challenged in federal court. In the
case of DACA, the University of California, among others, brought suit against
Acting Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) Elaine Duke in September 2017,
alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 500 et
seq. (2012) (APA), and seeking to enjoin the DHS from rescinding DACA.1
Similarly, in the case of the 2020 Census, numerous states, cities, and counties, the
District of Columbia, and the United States Conference of Mayors, brought suit
against Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross in April 2018, alleging violations of the
APA and seeking to enjoin the Department of Commerce from including the
citizenship question in the 2020 census.2
These two cases have highlighted an overlooked preliminary issue unique to
APA litigation: the “administrative record.” The APA standardizes “the procedures
by which federal agencies are accountable to the public,”3 and provides for liberal
1. See Complaint, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:17-cv-05211
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017). The claim also names the Department of Homeland Security as a defendant,
alleges constitutional violations, and seeks declaratory relief. Id. In this Article, I will use “the DACA
litigation” or “the DACA case” to refer to this matter collectively.
2. See Complaint, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 1:18-cv-02921 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2018).
3. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
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judicial review of federal agency actions,4 “creat[ing] a comprehensive remedial
scheme for those allegedly harmed by agency action.”5 However, the APA limits
judicial review of agency action to “the whole record, or those parts of it cited by a
party.”6 Under Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, this “record rule”7 limits
judicial review to the “administrative record that was before the [decisionmaker] at
the time he [or she] made his [or her] decision.”8 As such, in APA cases the
administrative record is “the focal point for judicial review,”9 with traditional
discovery unavailable outside of extreme circumstances.10
However, as Judge Furman rankled in Department of Commerce, “the term
‘administrative record’ is not particularly helpful in clarifying the proper object of
judicial review.”11 That is especially true where the challenged agency action is
“informal”—that is, the action is not subject to the APA’s more formal procedural
provisions, which provide guidance for what would be included in an administrative
record.12 Indeed, informal agency actions are the sort at issue in the DACA litigation
and Department of Commerce. Courts and commentators generally agree that the
APA’s text and legislative history sheds minimal light on the record rule as it should
apply to informal agency action13 and the Supreme Court has not helped matters,
providing essentially no guidance as to the proper scope of the administrative record
for informal agency action outside of the above quote from Overton Park. This has
led to a disjointed and inconsistent body of case law as lower courts develop their
own theories of the proper scope of an administrative record.14
Traditionally, lower courts would apply a narrow construction of the record
rule, defining the whole administrative record for informal agency action to include
primarily external documents submitted to the agency and considered directly by
the agency decisionmaker, excluding most if not all internal documents and
communications.15 But more recently, some district courts have begun to apply an

4. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967) (the APA’s “‘generous review
provisions’ must be given a hospitable interpretation”), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977).
5. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
7. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y. v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1997).
8. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
9. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
10. See Bos. Redevelopment Auth. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 838 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2016)
(“additional discovery may on rare occasions be proper in an APA case”); Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence v. Lujan, 908 F.2d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Overton Park allows discovery of the
agency decisionmaking process only in two circumstances.”).
11. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
12. See 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:27 (3d ed. 2010).
13. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 631 (“[T]he term ‘administrative record’
is not particularly helpful in clarifying the proper object of judicial review.”); Aram A. Gavoor & Steven
A. Platt, Administrative Records and the Courts, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2018).
14. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 4–45; see infra Part III.
15. See, e.g., Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 163 F.2d 689, 693
(D.C. Cir. 1947) (“Briefs, and memoranda made by the Commission or its staff, are not parts of the
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expansive reading of the record rule in reviewing informal agency action. These
courts define the administrative record to include any materials considered by
agency personnel involved in the decision-making process (not just the ultimate
decisionmaker), including “internal comments, draft reports, inter- or intra-agency
emails, revisions, memoranda, or meeting notes [that] inform an agency’s final
decision.”16 They also require the agency produce formal privilege logs
documenting any assertion of privilege for withheld documents.17 Judges Furman
and Alsup adopted similarly expansive readings of the record rule in their
preliminary rulings in Department of Commerce and the DACA
litigation respectively.18
In this Note, I argue in favor of the expansive construction of the record rule
becoming popular with some district courts reviewing informal agency action. In
lieu of definitive statutory text or legislative history, I explain the proper scope of
an administrative record for informal agency action with reference to the APA’s
broader scheme, specifically the judicial review provisions the record rule serves.19
I begin, in Part I, by providing an overview of the relevant provisions of the APA.
In doing so, I define informal agency action and describe the APA’s judicial review
provisions, paying particular attention to the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review that applies to informal agency action and requires such action be the
product of “reasoned decisionmaking.”20 In Part II, I describe the evolution of the
administrative record concept, expounding on the divergent case law and identifying
the key areas of dispute. Then, in Part III, I argue that the expansive construction
of the administrative record illustrated by Department of Commerce and the DACA
litigation is correct, both in terms of what is required for meaningful judicial review
of informal agency action and in terms of the administrative law principles that
underlie the APA.
The DACA litigation puts a fine point on the stakes. Is the administrative
record for an agency action revoking legal protection for 800,000 people simply 256
[administrative] record.”); Does 1-72 v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. CV 15-273 (CKK),
2016 WL 10771344, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2016); Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker, 217 F. Supp. 3d 310, 318
(D.D.C. 2016); Fund for Animals v. Williams, 391 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2005).
16. Inst. for Fisheries Res. v. Burwell, No. 16-cv-01574-VC, 2017 WL 89003, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Mnuchin, No. 3:17-CV-1930-B, 2018 WL
4103724, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2018); S.F. Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, No. 16-cv-05420-RS( JCS), 2018 WL 3846002, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2018); Sierra Club
v. Zinke, No. 17-cv-07187-WHO, 2018 WL 3126401, at *4–45 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2018); Indigenous
Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. CV-17-29-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 1796217, at *4–45
(D. Mont. Apr. 16, 2018); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. 15-cv-01590-HSG(KAW), 2017 WL
1709318, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2017); California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
No. C05-03508 EDL, 2006 WL 708914, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2006).
17. See supra note 16.
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (“[I]nterpret the relevant words not
in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, structure . . . and purpose.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
20. See Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011).
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pages of fourteen publicly available documents?21 The current DHS would have you
believe so.22 Or, is that administrative record the emails, letters, memoranda, notes,
media items, opinions, and other materials considered by the Acting Secretary and
her subordinates in the process of making the determination to revoke those legal
protections? This Note argues that it must be the latter because that allows courts
to fulfill their obligation under the APA to ensure federal agencies engaged in
reasoned decision-making, with implications for any area of law involving agency
action—from immigration, to telecommunications,23 healthcare,24 employment,25
environmental protection,26 land use,27 Native American affairs,28 and agriculture.29
I. INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA
In this Part, I provide an overview of the APA’s relevant provisions as context
for understanding the proper scope of the administrative record for an informal
agency action. I begin by defining informal agency action, which can only be done
by contrasting it with the formal agency actions prescribed by the APA’s procedural
provisions. Then, I describe the standard of review applicable to informal agency
under the APA’s judicial review provisions. In doing so, I demonstrate that although
informal agency actions are (by definition) exempt from the APA’s formal
procedural provisions, they are nevertheless subject to a minimum procedural
requirement under its judicial review provisions, which requires that even informal
agency action must be the product of an agency’s “reasoned decisionmaking.”30
A. Agency Action: Formal and Informal
Put simply, an informal agency action is one that is not subject to the APA’s
formal procedural provisions.31 Thus, even though this Note is focused on informal

21. See In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, and judgment
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017).
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. F.C.C., 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
24. See, e.g., Dana-Farber Cancer Inst. v. Hargan, 878 F.3d 336 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
25. See, e.g., McNeely v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 720 F. App’x 825 (9th Cir. 2017).
26. See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2015).
27. See e.g., Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561
(D. Mont. 2018), order amended and supplemented, 369 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (D. Mont. 2018), appeal
dismissed and remanded sub nom. Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 18-36068, 2019
WL 2542756 (9th Cir. June 6, 2019).
28. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 819 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2016).
29. See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Perdue, 320 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal
dismissed, No. 18-16378, 2018 WL 5304837 (9th Cir. 2018); Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack,
No. 15-CV-01590-HSG (KAW), 2017 WL 1709318, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2017).
30. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011).
31. See 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27 (“In the vernacular of administrative law, an ‘informal’
action is one that is not subject to a closed, well-defined record. Thus, under the APA, ‘formal’
(a/k/a ‘on the record’ or ‘trial-type’) actions are precisely those that are subject to the APA’s statutory
definition of the ‘record.’ The residual category of ‘informal’ agency action includes everything else.
Thus, even though notice-and-comment rulemaking has, in the decades since the APA was adopted in
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agency action, I must take a brief detour and describe those sorts of formal agency
action that are subject to the APA’s formal procedural provisions in order to define
informal agency action as the remainder.
The APA provides a formal procedural framework for some sorts of agency
action. The APA’s procedural provisions, codified 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., do so by
first distinguishing “rulemakings” from “adjudications.” A rulemaking is the
“agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”32 A rule, in turn,
“means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
availability and future effect.”33 In contrast, an adjudication is essentially a
case-by-case determination, typically the application of a statute or rule to a
particular circumstance.34 The APA provides formal procedural requirements for
both, which results in something akin to an evidentiary hearing for rulemakings35
and something akin to a court trial in front of agency officials or an administrative
law judge for adjudications.36
However, the APA only mandates an agency follow these formal procedures
where Congress requires the agency to do so by using certain triggering language in
the underlying statute. An agency must follow formal rulemaking procedures only
“[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing.”37 And an agency must follow formal adjudication procedures
only when an adjudication is “required by statute to be determined on the record
after an opportunity for an agency hearing.”38 Thus, without doing so explicitly, the
APA creates distinction between “formal agency action” (agency action subject to

1946, become encrusted with procedures and impact statements, it is still, counter-intuitively perhaps,
a species of ‘informal’ agency action under the original APA framework. The vast majority of agency
adjudications are not subject to a formal record requirement and thus also ‘informal’ in this sense.”).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2018).
33. Id. § 551(4).
34. Under § 551(7), an adjudication is an “agency process for formulating an order.” Id. § 551(7).
An order, in turn, “means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative,
injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making.” Id. § 551(6).
35. See generally id. §§ 553, 556, 557.
36. § 554(b) provides that persons entitled to an agency hearing must receive notice of “the
time, place, and nature of the hearing,” “the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is
to be held,” and “the matters of fact and law asserted.” Id. § 554(b). In the event the parties are unable
to resolve the matter at issue by consent, § 556 and § 557 provide for trial-like hearings and
decision-making, appealable to the agency head. If, however, the relevant statute does not trigger formal
adjudication procedures, the APA does not subject the agency to a specific procedural regime. Id. §§
556, 557.
37. Id. § 553(c) (2018). Although a statute in theory need not use the precise wording of § 553(c)
to trigger formal rulemaking procedures, see United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,
238–46 (1973), the precise phrasing is “virtually . . . a touchstone test.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2018). This language is not quite the “virtual touchstone” as for formal
rulemaking, see supra note 37, but courts prefer not to invoke these procedural requirements without a
clear expression of Congress’s intent to that effect, particularly where the agency does not interpret the
relevant hearing requirement to trigger formal adjudication procedures. See Dominion Energy Brayton
Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2006).
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the APA’s formal procedural requirements) and “informal agency action” (agency
action not subject to the APA’s formal procedural requirements). Courts and
scholars alike have widely adopted this parlance.39
Following the APA’s rulemaking/adjudication framework, informal agency
action can be understood as encompassing informal rulemakings and informal
adjudications. Informal rulemakings include (1) rulemakings subject to the APA’s
less stringent “notice and comment” requirements and (2) rulemakings entirely
exempt from the APA’s procedural provisions.40
Notice and comment procedures are the default procedural regime for
rulemakings.41 However, the APA exempts from its notice and comment
requirements those rulemakings that result in “interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”42 Such
rulemakings are not subject to the APA’s procedural provisions at all.
For adjudications, the APA provides no intermediate procedural regime.43
Thus, an informal adjudication is simply one not subject to the APA’s formal
adjudication procedures. Given the APA’s emphasis on standardized administrative
procedure, it might be easy to assume that formal agency action dominates the
workings of federal agencies. However, while this may once have been true, the vast
majority of agency action is now of the informal sort.44 This includes innocuous
activities such as the Forest Service’s approval of a campfire permit for a National
Forest but also agency actions with significant consequences for millions of
Americans. For example, the Obama administration promulgated DACA and the
related Deferred Action of Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
as general statements of policy (informal rules), and the Trump DHS has attempted

39. See supra note 31.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).
41. § 553 provides the procedural requirements for notice and comment rulemaking. Id. § 553.
As the name suggests, under § 553, an agency must provide notice of a proposed rule, typically by
publishing it in the Federal Register. Id. The notice must describe the “time, place, and nature of the
public rule making proceeding,” reference the “legal authority under which the rule is proposed,” and
provide an adequate description of the proposed rule. Id. Then, the agency must provide an opportunity
for comment, whereby “interested persons” may submit “written data, views, or arguments.” Id. The
agency must consider the comments and in publishing the final rule, provide a “concise general
statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose.” Id.
42. Id. § 553(b)(A).
43. Id.
44. More popular at the time of the APA’s enactment, formal rulemakings in particular have
fallen out of favor due to the burdensome procedural requirements. The classic example of formal
rulemaking’s inefficiency is the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) proceedings for food labeling
in the 1960s. Most notably, one such proceeding took more than ten years to determine what level of
peanuts to require in peanut butter in order to “promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of
consumers.” The FDA sought a 90% peanut requirement but was vehemently opposed by the peanut
butter industry, which sought an 87% peanut requirement. See STEPHEN G. BREYER
ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 505 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 8th
ed. 2017).

First to Printer_Alter.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

A RECORD OF WHAT?

3/30/20 4:15 PM

1053

to repeal DACA in the same manner.45 Likewise, the Department of Commerce’s
decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census—which could have
significant political ramifications—took place without a formal adjudication.46
Environmentalists are familiar with land use permits that approve controversial uses
of federal land such as the Keystone XL pipeline.47 Similarly, the Department of the
Interior has implemented various controversial policies regarding Native American
tribes through permitting and other informal actions.48
Thus, though not subject to the APA’s formal procedural provisions, informal
agency action plays a significant role in American life under the modern
administrative state. However, federal agencies engaging in informal agency action
are not entirely free from procedural limitations under the APA. Rather, as
described in the next Section, the APA’s judicial review provisions, which apply to
formal and informal agency action alike, require informal agency action be the
product of the agency’s “reasoned decisionmaking.”49
B. Judicial Review of Agency Action
Unlike the APA’s procedural provisions, which only apply to certain types of
agency action, the APA’s judicial review provisions, codified 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.,
apply to all forms of agency action, whether formal or informal.50 The APA
provides a right of review to any party “suffering legal wrong because of agency
action,” waiving the federal government’s sovereign immunity for non-damages
claims brought against agencies and their officers.51 This language “embodies the
basic presumption [in favor] of judicial review” for APA claims—“judicial review
of . . . agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is
persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”52 Section 704,
however, does limit judicial review to “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”53
Nonetheless, the finality requirement is to be “interpreted in a ‘pragmatic’ and

45. In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, and judgment
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171–73 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (regarding DAPA).
46. See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
47. See e.g., Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 570–71
(D. Mont. 2018) (permitting Keystone XL pipeline).
48. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 819 F.3d 1084, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2016).
49. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018) (judicial review provisions apply to administrative action except
where statute precludes judicial review or the action is committed to agency discretion by law).
51. Id. § 702.
52. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018).
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‘flexible’ manner”54 in order to give the APA’s “generous review
provisions . . . hospitable interpretation.”55
In contrast to this broad grant of reviewability stand the prescribed standards
of review, which are narrow and deferential to the agency. Section 706 provides that
“the reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions” upon finding the action meets any of six standards.56 The
dominant standard, however—and the standard applied to the informal agency
actions this Note is concerned with—requires the court to set aside an agency action
upon finding it “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”57
Application of the arbitrary and capricious standard has developed a robust
body of case law, elaborating—though perhaps not clarifying—the structure of
arbitrary and capricious review. Although arbitrary and capricious review “is to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”58 However,
“courts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged
in reasoned decisionmaking.”59 Thus, arbitrary and capricious review focuses on the
agency’s decision-making, not the ultimate decision:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.60

54. Dietary Supplemental Coal., Inc. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149).
55. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140–41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
57. Id. This “arbitrary and capricious” standard operates as a catch-all, providing the default
standard of review where none of the other, more limited standards apply. Ass’n of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J.).
58. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
59. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011).
60. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
44 (1983).
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The doctrine has developed various branches to address changes in agency
position,61 flawed legal reasoning,62 improper political motivation,63 and so forth.
Ultimately, under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard, “not only must
an agency’s decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process
by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational.”64 The agency must
“articulate[ ] a rational basis for its decision,”65 and must provide a “rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”66 Indeed, “the orderly

61. F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009) (“[T]he requirement
that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display
awareness that it is changing position. . . . But it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is
permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be
better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the agency need not
always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank
slate. Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict
those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests
that must be taken into account. It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters.”) (citations
omitted) (emphasis in original). There is some debate as to whether agency changes of position are
subject to a heightened standard of review. In Fox Television, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, is
adamant that agency changes in position do not trigger any heightened standard of review. See id. at 514
(“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all
agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no such heightened standard.
And our opinion in State Farm neither held nor implied that every agency action representing a policy
change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the first
instance.”). This position is consistent with State Farm, which “fully recognize[d] that ‘regulatory
agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever,’ and that an agency must be given ample
latitude to ‘adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’” 463 U.S. at 42
(1983). However, some Circuits still appear to apply a heightened standard to changes in agency policy.
See Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To satisfy this requirement, the
agency must provide not only a reasoned explanation for its current position, but also a reasoned
explanation for why the change was warranted or why the new position is preferable.”) (collecting
cases); see also Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2015) (“There
was a change in presidential administrations just days after the . . . Rule was promulgated in 2001.
Elections have policy consequences. But, State Farm teaches that even when reversing a policy after an
election, an agency may not simply discard prior factual findings without a reasoned explanation.”).
62. See, e.g., Safe Air for Everyone v. U.S. E.P.A., 488 F.3d 1088, 1101 (9th Cir. 2007)
63. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43–44; see, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1129,
1134–35 (9th Cir.), opinion amended and superseded, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007).
64. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998).
65. Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).
66. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Some courts
describe this “reasoned decisionmaking” standard in terms of whether the agency has “taken a ‘hard
look’ at the salient problems.” Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1488 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923 (1971)). However, there is some question as to whether the “hard look” language is
appropriate. See Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 687 n.15 (9th
Cir. 2007) (acknowledging usage of “hard look” but concluding: “Because the Supreme Court has never
explicitly embraced the ‘hard look’ approach to judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard of the APA, we adhere to the Supreme Court’s explicit guidance in State Farm that an agency
must cogently explain its actions and demonstrate a rational connection between the facts it found and
the choice it made.”) (citations omitted). But see 7 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., WEST’S FEDERAL
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functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the
administrative agency acted by clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.”67
Accordingly, “[c]ourts . . . may not accept post hoc rationalizations for agency
action . . . nor may they supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the
agency itself has not given.”68 Moreover, as the Supreme Court confirmed in
Department of Commerce, an agency action will be found arbitrary and capricious if it
rests on a contrived, pretextual justification.69
In short, the APA generally limits judicial review of agency action to the
agency’s process for picking between reasonable policy choices, not the policy
merits of the choice itself. Of course, the APA’s judicial review provisions provide
one further limitation on the judicial review of agency action: the record rule, which
I explore in Parts II and III.
II. THE RECORD RULE
This Part provides an overview of the record rule—the APA’s limit on judicial
review of agency action to “the whole record, or those parts of it cited by a
party”70—paying particular attention to its current application to informal agency
action. First, I take a moment to describe the mechanics of disputing an
administrative record in APA litigation. In doing so, my aim is to identify some key
terms that will help clarify the muddled history and application of the record rule to
informal agency action. Second, I provide an early history of the record rule, from
its limited pre-APA roots to the post-APA Supreme Court cases that provide
limited guidance as to its scope. Third, I describe the current state of the record
rule, identifying areas of agreement but also the primary areas of dispute between
agencies, private litigants, and the courts with regard to the proper scope of the
administrative record for informal agency action.
A. The Mechanics of Disputing an Administrative Record
APA litigation is wrought with litigants’ attempts to get favorable evidence in
front of the reviewing court, either as part of the administrative record, or through
an exception to the record rule that allows the reviewing court to consider
extra-record evidence.71 This has resulted in generally accepted—but frequently

ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 8106 (“Without using the term [‘hard look’], the Supreme Court used
the hard look approach in [State Farm].”).
67. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
68. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1043
(N.D. Cal.), aff’d sub nom., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476
(9th Cir. 2018); see also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43–44 (“The reviewing court should not attempt itself
to make up for such deficiencies: ‘We may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the
agency itself has not given.’”), quoting, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
69. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
71. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 16.
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mislabeled—mechanisms by which the administrative record is presented and
contested in APA litigation.
After the plaintiff files a complaint alleging an APA violation, the defendant
agency certifies and files with the court what it asserts to be the administrative
record upon which the challenged action was based and judicial review is to
consider.72 Although an “agency may not unilaterally determine what constitutes the
Administrative Record,” the agency’s preparation and certification of the
administrative record is subject to a “presumption of administrative regularity,”73
which traditionally makes it difficult for a plaintiff to add materials favorable to its
case.74 Unless the plaintiff is able to resolve any administrative record disputes with
the agency informally,75 it is left with two options to get materials not included in
the certified administrative record in front of the judge.
First, the plaintiff could bring a “motion to complete” the administrative
record with certain materials or categories of materials.76 This would involve arguing
that the materials in question were properly a part of the administrative
record—i.e., that the materials were a part of the record on which the agency based
its decision. To be successful, the plaintiff would need to overcome the presumption
of regularity, which requires a showing of “clear evidence to the contrary.”77 Such
proof would include direct evidence that an agency decisionmaker considered the
material question or a showing that the agency relied on an erroneous definition of
the administrative record in compiling it.78 A successful motion to complete the
administrative record results in a court order that the agency certify a new record
including specified materials or categories of materials.79
Second, the plaintiff could bring a “motion to supplement” the administrative
record.80 This would involve arguing that even if the materials in question are not
properly considered part of the administrative record (i.e., because they were not
before the agency during the decision-making process), the materials fall within a
recognized exception to the record rule such that the lower court should consider

72. See Pac. Shores Subdivision, Cal. Water Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 448
F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2006); Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 11–13.
73. Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739–40 (10th Cir. 1993) (“However, the
designation of the Administrative Record, like any established administrative procedure, is entitled to a
presumption of administrative regularity.”).
74. 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27.
75. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 35 n.226.
76. See, e.g., Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. 11-1310-SC, 2011 WL 5038500, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2011).
77. Bar MK Ranches, 994 F.2d at 740.
78. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA,
2017 WL 4642324, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017); Pitman v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs.,
No. 2:17-cv-00166-CW-EJF, 2018 BL 234618, at *4 (D. Ut. July 2, 2018).
79. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2017 WL 4642324, at *3; Pitman, 2018 BL 234618, at *4.
80. See, e.g., Silver State Land, LLC v. Beaudreau, 59 F. Supp. 3d 158, 161 (D.D.C. 2014).
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them.81 Courts have recognized various exceptions to the record rule where
informal agency action is at issue, including where: (1) the plaintiff makes a showing
of bad faith or improper behavior;82 (2) the agency failed to consider relevant
factors;83 (3) background information is necessary to help the court understand a
technical issue;84 and (4) the record is so incomplete as to frustrate judicial review.85
These circumstances may also justify discovery.86 As a rule, the exceptions to the
record rule are narrowly applied.87
The completion/supplementation dichotomy is a straightforward way of
characterizing disputes over an administrative record’s contents. It allows for a
distinction between materials that should be considered because they were properly
a part of the administrative record from the beginning (in the case of completion)
and materials that are not properly part of the record but may be considered
nonetheless (in the case of supplementation). However, I should note that although
the mechanisms and process for disputing an administrative record are generally
consistent, this vernacular is not consistently used, as some courts and
commentators have lamented.88 This terminological inconsistency serves as a bit of
an appetizer for the broader confusion regarding what an agency is obliged to
include in the administrative record for informal agency action. Nevertheless, in the

81. See generally Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the
Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (1984).
82. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971); Animal Def. Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1988), amended, 867 F.2d 1244
(9th Cir. 1989) (“Courts may inquire outside the agency record when plaintiffs make a showing of
agency bad faith. For this exception to apply, ‘[n]ormally there must be a strong showing of bad faith
or improper behavior before the court may inquire into the thought processes of administrative
decisionmakers.’”) (citation omitted).
83. See 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27 (“The ‘relevant factors’ ground for supplementation comes
into play where a party seeks to demonstrate that an agency decision was arbitrary because the agency
did not consider some important aspect of the regulatory problem before it.”). In some cases, this
would be grounds for completing the record, if materials before the agency showed the relevant factor,
but it is an appropriate ground for supplementation where the material was not before the agency.
84. See Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 n.166 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (collecting cases).
85. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. Courts sometimes allow parties to “supplement” the
record with documents the agency in fact “relied” on in coming to its decision but that were not
included in the certified administrative record. See, e.g., Friends of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend
Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 1993). However, adding such documents to the
administrative record is more properly understood as “completion” as they should always have been a
part of the record. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 31–35. Conflating completion with
supplementation glosses over the distinction between materials considered by the agency and materials
not considered by the agency, which nevertheless may be relevant for judicial review. See id.
86. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420; Hodel, 840 F.2d at 1437.
87. See, e.g., Citizens for Alts. to Radioactive Dumping v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 485 F.3d 1091,
1096 (10th Cir. 2007) (“It is only in ‘extremely limited circumstances, such as where the agency ignored
relevant factors it should have considered or considered factors left out of the formal record’ that we
will consider extra-record evidence.”).
88. See Water Supply & Storage Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 910 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1261 n.4
(D. Colo. 2012); Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 31–35, 64; James N. Saul, Comment, Overly Restrictive
Records and the Frustration of Judicial Review, 38 ENVIR. L. 1301, 1319–20 (2008).
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interest of relying on the most precise vocabulary available, I adopt the
completion/supplementation distinction for the purposes of this Note.89
B. The Early History of the Record Rule
Courts appear to have applied a rudimentary version of the record rule in
reviewing agency action before the Congress enacted the APA in 1946, which
limited judicial review to the record the subject agency action was based on and
typically prevented the parties from conducting discovery.90 However, there is
limited case law as to the scope of this pre-APA record rule due perhaps in part to
the relatively limited role of federal agencies before the New Deal.91
Enacted in 1946, the APA limits judicial review of agency action to the “the
whole record, or those parts of it cited by a party.”92 However, the significant
legislative history surrounding the APA provides only a cursory mention of the
“whole record” requirement.93 For formal adjudications and formal rulemakings,
the APA defines the administrative record as “[t]he transcript of testimony and
exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding.”94 Indeed,
the APA’s formal rulemaking and adjudication procedures serve in part to create a
well-defined administrative record for judicial review.95 However, the APA
provides no such guidance for informal agency action, which left open the
possibility that courts would review informal agency action based on evidence
presented in the first instance to the reviewing court.96 The Supreme Court rejected
this possibility in Overton Park, the seminal case regarding the application of the
record rule to informal agency action.97 Indeed, what limited legislative history exists

89. See generally Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 31–35 (doing the same); Saul, supra note 88,
at 1319–20.
90. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (“Such an examination of a judge
would be destructive of judicial responsibility. We have explicitly held . . . that it was not the function
of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary. Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such
a scrutiny, so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected.”) (internal quotation
and citations omitted); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 443 (1930) (“The validity
of an order of the Secretary, like that of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, must be
determined upon the record of the proceedings before him . . . .”). But see Cincinnati, New Orleans
& T.P. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 162 U.S. 184, 196 (1896) (“We do not mean, of course,
that either party, in a trial in the court, is to be restricted to the evidence that was before the commission,
but that the purposes of the act call for a full inquiry by the commission into all the circumstances and
conditions pertinent to the questions involved.”).
91. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 14–18.
92. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
93. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 18–20 (theorizing this may have been because of stricter
standing requirements at the time).
94. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2012).
95. See 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27; Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 12.
96. See 3 KOCH supra note 12, § 8:27 (“One possible judicial response to the absence of any
statutory definition of the “record” for informal proceedings would be to regard them, simply, as
non-record proceedings. On this approach, an agency attempting to defend its action during judicial
review would not be bound by a record it created during its own proceedings.”)
97. See id.
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regarding the record rule suggests its drafters intended the record rule to apply to
all forms of agency action.98
The Supreme Court first addressed the record rule in Overton Park. In that
case, various local and national stakeholders challenged the Secretary of
Transportation’s authorization of federal funding for the construction of a six-lane
highway through Overton Park, a 342-acre public park in Memphis, Tennessee.99
Under the relevant statutes, the Secretary could only approve funding for the project
if “‘no feasible and prudent’” route around the park existed and there had been “‘all
possible planning to minimize harm to the park.’”100 In the district court, the agency
presented affidavits from the Secretary, which indicated that his decision could be
supported by the relevant facts.101 The Court found these “post-hoc
rationalizations” to be an “inadequate basis for [judicial] review.”102 Rather, the
Court concluded that judicial review under the APA’s record rule “is to be based on
the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his
decision,” not evidence presented to the reviewing court in the first instance.103 This
statement now serves as the baseline rule for an administrative record.104 Because
that record had not been presented, and had not been compiled in the process of
the agency’s decision-making, the Court remanded to the district court for it to
develop the administrative record without providing further guidance as to its
proper scope.105
In Camp v. Pitts, the Court re-affirmed that “the focal point for judicial review
should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made
initially in the reviewing court.”106 There, the Court considered the Comptroller of
Currency’s rejection of the plaintiff’s application for authorization to organize a new
bank in Hartsville, South Carolina.107 In rejecting the application, the Comptroller
communicated the decision through a letter to the applicants, which the office
reiterated in a second letter upon a request for reconsideration.108 The agency
presented the two letters and associated documents that were part of the
preparation of those letters as the administrative record in the district court.109
Before the Court was the Fourth Circuit’s remand instruction, which envisioned the
creation of an evidentiary record through a de novo hearing in front of the district
court.110 The Court rejected that instruction, which it found to “put aside the
98. See id.
99. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971).
100. Id. at 404–06.
101. Id. at 409.
102. Id. at 419.
103. Id. at 420.
104. See supra Part II.C.
105. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420–21.
106. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).
107. Id. at 138.
108. Id. at 138–39.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 140.
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extensive administrative record already made and presented to the [district]
court.”111 Rather, the Court remanded to the Fourth Circuit for further
consideration, advising that if the court of appeal found that the proffered
administrative record could not support the Comptroller’s decision, the proper
action was to vacate that decision and remand to the agency for
further consideration.112
C. The Current State of the Record Rule
Taken together, Overton Park and Camp clarify some aspects of the record rule
as applied to informal agency action. First, the record rule does in fact apply to
informal agency action.113 Second, judicial review must focus on the record in
existence at the time of the decision.114 Third, discovery beyond the administrative
record is disfavored but allowed at least where there is no record for judicial review
to consider.115 Fourth, where the administrative record does not support a decision,
the proper judicial action is to vacate the action and remand to the agency for
further consideration.116
Lower courts have since found common ground on other rules for the
administrative record’s scope. Courts today generally agree the administrative
record should not be limited to those materials directly considered by the agency
decisionmaker.117 Rather, lower courts generally agree that an administrative record
should include materials considered by subordinates involved in the ultimate
decision.118 This, however, is where the consensus ends, and the inconsistency
begins. Moreover, as the DACA litigation and Department of Commerce illustrate, the
government has recently insisted that the administrative record need not include
anything more than what passed before the ultimate decisionmaker’s eyes, reverting
to a particularly narrow version of the record rule.119

111. Id. at 142.
112. Id. at 142–43.
113. See 3 KOCH, supra note 12, § 8:27.
114. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
115. Id. at 420.
116. Id.; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
117. See Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The whole
administrative record, therefore, consists of all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered
by agency decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to the agency’s position.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 638 F.2d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 1980); Nat’l Courier
Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“The proper
approach, therefore, would appear to be to consider any document that might have influenced the
agency’s decision . . . .”); Ctr. for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1275
(D. Colo. 2010) (“If the agency decision maker based his decision on the work and recommendations
of subordinates, those materials should be included in the record.”); Clairton Sportsmen’s Club
v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 882 F. Supp. 455, 465 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (“A document need not literally pass before
the eyes of the final agency decisionmaker to be considered part of the administrative record.”).
118. See cases cited supra note 117. But see Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161, 1181
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d in part, and rev’d in part, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982).
119. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2017

First to Printer_Alter.docx (Do Not Delete)

1062

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/30/20 4:15 PM

[Vol. 10:1045

The APA’s reference to the “whole record,”120 and Overton Park’s insistence on
the “full administrative record”121 before the agency suggest a broad application of
the record rule for informal agency action. This, however, has rarely been the case.
Indeed, lower courts faced with motions to complete an administrative record in
such cases traditionally insisted on a narrow scope, generally excluding internal
materials, especially communications, from the proper scope of an administrative
record.122 This is consistent with some agency guidance for compiling an
administrative record, which excludes most materials (such as emails, notes, drafts,
and other informal materials) outside of formalized final agency documents.123
More recently, some lower courts have begun to buck the traditional approach
and grant broad orders to complete the administrative record with not just specific
documents identified by the parties but also entire categories of excluded materials,
including “internal comments, draft reports, inter- or intra-agency emails, revisions,
memoranda, or meeting notes [that] inform an agency’s final decision” along with
privilege logs documenting any assertions of deliberative process, attorney/client,
or other privilege.124 These courts may find the agency’s initially certified record
incomplete on the basis of the agency’s use of an overly narrow definition of what
constitutes the “whole record” or on the basis of documents presented by the
plaintiff, or a combination of both factors.125 The DACA case and Department of
Commerce provide two of the most noteworthy illustrations.
In the DACA litigation, the University of California, among others, alleged
that then-Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke’s decision to revoke DACA was
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.126 DHS then certified an
administrative record that “consisted of fourteen documents spanning 256 pages,

WL 4642324, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017); Transcript of Oral Argument at 81, New York v. Dep’t
of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-02921).
120. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (emphasis added).
121. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (emphasis added).
122. See, e.g., San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d
26, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc); ASSE Int’l, Inc. v. Kerry, No. SACV 14-00534-CJC-( JPRx), 2018
WL 3326687, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018); Coastal Conservation Ass’n v. Locke,
No. 2:09-cv-641-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 1439071, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2010) (citing Moye, O’Brien,
O’Rourke, Hogan & Prickert v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 376 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004));
Amfac Resorts, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 143 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[D]eliberative
intra-agency memoranda and other such records . . . need not be included in the record.”) (citing In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Office of Comptroller of Currency, 156 F.3d 1279, 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Madison County Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 622 F.2d 393,
395 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 331 (2d Cir. 1977));
Richard McMillan, Jr. & Todd D. Peterson, The Permissible Scope of Hearings, Discovery, and Additional
Fact-Finding During Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action, 1982 DUKE L.J. 333, 342 (1982).
123. Saul, supra note 88, at 1314–19; see Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 11–13.
124. Inst. for Fisheries Res. v. Burwell, No. 16-cv-01574-VC, 2017 WL 89003, at *1; see also
cases cited supra note 16.
125. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA,
2017 WL 4642324, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017); Department of Commerce, Oral Ruling on
Administrative Record, Docket No. 205 at 81 ( July 20, 2018).
126. See supra note 1.
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each of which was already available to the public.”127 Plaintiffs moved for
completion of the administrative record, arguing that it (1) only contained
documents directly considered by Acting Secretary Duke, improperly excluding
indirectly considered documents and (2) did not even include all of the documents
Acting Secretary Duke herself considered.128 DHS opposed the motion, arguing
that an administrative record is properly limited to those unprivileged materials
directly considered by the decisionmaker.129 Judge Alsup ordered DHS to complete
the administrative record and provide a privilege log for any documents withheld
based on an assertion of privilege.130 Specifically, Judge Alsup ordered DHS to
complete the administrative record by adding to it all emails, letters,
memoranda, notes, media items, opinions and other materials directly or
indirectly considered in the final agency decision to rescind DACA, to the
following extent: (1) all materials actually seen or considered, however
briefly, by Acting Secretary Duke in connection with the potential or actual
decision to rescind DACA (except as stated in the next paragraph below),
(2) all DACA-related materials considered by persons (anywhere in the
government) who thereafter provided Acting Secretary Duke with written
advice or input regarding the actual or potential rescission of DACA, (3)
all DACA-related materials considered by persons (anywhere in the
government) who thereafter provided Acting Secretary Duke with verbal
input regarding the actual or potential rescission of DACA, (4) all
comments and questions propounded by Acting Secretary Duke to
advisors or subordinates or others regarding the actual or potential
rescission of DACA and their responses, and (5) all materials directly or
indirectly considered by former Secretary of DHS John Kelly leading to his
February 2017 memorandum not to rescind DACA.131
This order came prior to Judge Alsup ruling on DHS’s pending motion to
dismiss, which could have rendered the need for an administrative record moot.132
The Ninth Circuit, in a split decision ruling on the government’s petition for
a writ of mandamus, found no clear error in Judge Alsup’s order: “Put bluntly, the
notion that the head of a United States agency would decide to terminate a program
giving legal protections to roughly 800,000 people based solely on 256 pages of
publicly available documents is not credible, as the district court concluded.”133 On
appeal, the Supreme Court did not address the administrative record issue directly.
Rather, in a per curiam opinion, the Court ruled that the district court should have
granted the government’s earlier motion to stay completion of the record until it
127. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2017 WL
4642324, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *9–10.
131. Id.
132. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 443, 445 (2017).
133. In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017) (footnotes omitted), cert. granted,
and judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 443 (2017).
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ruled on the government’s motion to dismiss, vacating the Ninth Circuit’s decision
and remanding for further proceedings.134 However, the Court acknowledged “[t]he
Government makes serious arguments that at least portions of the District Court’s
order are overly broad,” referring to the order to complete the administrative
record.135 Justice Breyer, joined by the Court’s other liberal justices, dissented from
an earlier stay pending review, finding no error in Judge Alsup’s order.136 On
remand, the district court denied the government’s two motions to dismiss as to
plaintiff’s claims that the decision to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious in
violation of the APA.137 In a subsequent order, Judge Alsup doubled down on his
construction of the record rule and required the government to complete the
administrative record in a manner substantially the same as he had previously,
narrowing the order only so far as to limit it to materials held by the agency (as
opposed to materials held by the White House) among a few other marginal
changes.138 The Ninth Circuit upheld Judge Alsup’s ruling on the government’s
motion to dismiss,139 and the government has petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari on the issue, leaving open the question of what the “whole record”
for the DACA litigation will ultimately consist of.
In Department of Commerce, various states, municipalities, and other
stakeholders brought suit alleging that Secretary of Commerce Wilber Ross’s
decision to add a citizenship status question to the 2020 Census was arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the APA.140 Commerce then certified an administrative
record that, like DHS’s first certified record in the DACA litigation, only contained
documents Secretary Ross considered directly.141 Moreover, the record began with
a Department of Justice memorandum to Commerce supporting the addition of the
citizenship question, which Secretary Ross had claimed publicly to be the impetus
for adding the citizenship question.142 Plaintiffs moved for completion of the
record, arguing Commerce’s first certified record was incomplete (1) for its failure
to include materials the Secretary considered indirectly—i.e. materials his
subordinates considered before advising the Secretary—and (2) because emails and
134. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. at 445.
135. Id.
136. In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 374 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
137. Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1049–50
(N.D. Cal. 2018).
138. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2018
WL 1210551, at *8–12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018).
139. See generally Regents of Univ. of Cal. V. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (government’s first motion to dismiss), aff’d sub nom.; Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(government’s second motion to dismiss), aff’d sub nom.; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018).
140. See Complaint, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 1:18-cv-02921
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2018).
141. See id.
142. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 530–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
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other correspondence plaintiffs had obtained through Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)143 requests demonstrated the decision-making process in fact begun well
before the Justice memoranda.144 Ruling from the bench, Judge Furman granted
plaintiffs’ motion to complete the administrative record.145 But rather than provide
a detailed order as Judge Alsup did in the DACA litigation, Judge Furman simply
directed Commerce to complete the record on the bases of the deficiencies
identified by the plaintiffs and provide a privilege log for any documents withheld
on the basis of an assertion of privilege.146 However, Judge Furman implicitly
adopted a broad reading of the record rule consistent with that from the DACA
litigation, given that much of plaintiff’s proffered FOIA materials—the basis of the
completed record—were the same sorts of internal, informal documents (emails,
drafts, etc.) referenced in Judge Alsup’s order.147
Much of the subsequent procedural disputes in Department of Commerce,
centered around Judge Furman’s concurrent order allowing plaintiffs to depose
Secretary Ross and certain of his subordinates.148 But, for our purposes, it is enough
to note that Judge Furman, following a bench trial, ultimately rendered a verdict
that Secretary Ross’s decision to a citizenship question to the 2020 Census was
arbitrary and capricious, taking pains to demonstrate that the administrative record
alone supported his decision, without reference to any extra-record evidence.149 The
government appealed this decision directly to the Supreme Court, which upheld it,
holding that Secretary Ross’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020
Census was arbitrary and capricious because it rested on a pretextual justification
contrived to disguise the agency’s actual reason for wishing to add the question.150
As to the issue of the administrative record, the Court again refused to delineate the
appropriate boundaries of an administrative record for informal agency action,
repeatedly emphasizing that the 12,000 odd documents the government added to
their original record were added by stipulation of the parties.151 And unlike the lower
court, the Supreme Court based its conclusion on the entire record, including the
extra-record discovery and deposition testimony that had been admitted.152 Thus,
the Court left unsettled the appropriate scope of the administrative record for lower
courts and commentators alike to debate.153

143. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
144. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 530.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., In re Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 16, 16–18 (2018).
149. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 514–19, 660.
150. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, No. 18-966, slip op. at 28–29 (S. Ct. June 27, 2019).
151. Id. at 7, 25.
152. Id. at 25–26.
153. Id. at 25. There are a few nuggets of dicta that could be mined to glean a suggestion of the
Court’s leanings on the matter. On the one hand, the Court acknowledged that when Judge Furman
ordered the government to complete the administrative record while simultaneously authorizing
extra-record discovery, “the most that was warranted was an order to complete the administrative
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Part of that debate is the larger movement in the lower courts towards a broad
definition of the record rule for APA challenges of informal agency action, which
the DACA litigation and Department of Commerce are representative of.154 As I argue
in the next Part, this broad application of the record rule is necessary for meaningful
judicial review of whether the informal agency action is the product of the agency’s
reasoned decision-making, and desirable in terms of the administrative law
principles that motivated the APA’s adoption and subsequent interpretation.
III. THE “WHOLE RECORD” FOR INFORMAL AGENCY ACTION
The record rule and the concept of an administrative record derive from the
APA’s requirement that judicial review of agency action, even informal agency
action, be based on the “whole record.”155 The traditional approach to the record
rule limits judicial review of informal agency action to only those materials directly

record.” Id. But this does not indicate that the Court agreed with the extent of the completion that came
about. On the other hand, the Court remarked without elaboration that “[i]t is rare to review a record
as extensive as the one before us when evaluating informal agency action—and it should be.” Id. at 28.
But this statement does not specify the “administrative record” and is likely attributable to the Court’s
stated issues with the timing of Judge Furman’s discovery orders, which contributed to the larger
“record” for review. See id. at 25. In short, the Court dashed the hopes of anyone hoping it would take
the opportunity in Department of Commerce to clarify the scope of an administrative record for informal
agency action. See, e.g., Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 25, 76–77.
154. See Saul, supra note 88, at 1314–19; see also Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 11–13. There
has been relatively little academic commentary on the proper scope of an administrative record,
although the issue has received some attention in recent years, with limited arguments for and against
a narrow or expansive approach to the record rule. On the one hand, Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13,
represent a modern “strict” approach to the record rule, which adheres more closely to what I describe
as the “traditional” approach to the record rule. Gavoor and Platt acknowledge that an administrative
record should include materials considered by agency staffers involved in the decision-making process,
not simply materials considered by the ultimate decisionmaker. Id. at 33. However, they would
apparently categorically exclude “deliberative” pre-decision documents, regardless of whether they are
formally privileged. Id. at 39 (“Because these materials do not belong in the record in the first place, no
log is required for deliberative-process material not included in the administrative record. In other
words, whether the deliberative-process material is privileged is irrelevant. A court may prefer to review
the withheld or redacted information in camera to ensure it is properly outside the scope of the record
(e.g., deliberative process) or properly privileged. A court may also require the government file the
unredacted version under seal.”) (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, Saul, supra note 88, at
126–29, argues in favor of an expansive definition of the administrative record. I build on Saul’s
argument by specifically approaching the issue in terms of the sorts of documents that inform arbitrary
and capricious review, providing a complimentary analysis informed by subsequent case law of why an
expansive definition of the record rule is necessary for meaningful arbitrary and capricious review.
Recent work by Professor Michael Ray Harris also provides insight into the debate. See Michael Ray
Harris, Standing in the Way of Judicial Review: Assertion of the Deliberative Process Privilege in APA
Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349 (2009). Harris’s contention is that overly broad assertions of deliberative
process privilege frustrate APA review by depriving the reviewing court of materials of fundamental
relevance to the arbitrary and capricious inquiry. Id. at 353, 386. As Harris’s focus is more narrow—on
assertions of privilege, not the place of deliberative documents writ large, whether or not privileged or
claimed to be—he does not directly contend that deliberative and communicative internal documents
should be categorically included in administrative records, subject to a justified assertion of privilege,
as I do here. Id.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
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considered by the agency decisionmaker and categorically excludes most, if not all,
internal documents and communications from the administrative record.156
Recently, some lower courts have adopted a more expansive approach to the record
rule, requiring that an administrative record of informal agency action include
materials considered by agency personnel involved in the decision-making process
beyond the decisionmaker, and categorically including internal materials subject to
a justified claim of privilege by the agency.157
In this Part, I contend that the expansive approach is the better interpretation
of the APA’s “whole record” requirement for two reasons. First, the expansive
approach better enables courts reviewing informal agency action to engage in the
“thorough, probing, in-depth review” of the agency’s decision-making mandated by
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.158 Second, the expansive approach
comports with the fundamental principles of administrative law that underlie the
APA. I conclude this Part by rebutting the most common critiques of the
expansive approach.
A. The Record Rule and Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Overton Park serves as a baseline for the record rule as it applies to informal
agency action. Under Overton Park, the administrative record includes only those
materials (a) “before” the agency (b) at the time of its decision.159 Both the narrow
and the expansive approach to the record rule acknowledge these limitations, which
properly keep the reviewing court’s focus on the agency’s actual decision-making
process, not advantageous post-hoc rationalizations or materials the agency never
considered.160 But Overton Park is unclear as to what it means for material to be
“before” the agency. This leads to the two areas of dispute in record rule
jurisprudence: (1) whether an administrative record should include any material
considered by personnel involved in the decision-making process or only the
decisionmaker; and (2) what types of materials should be a part of the “whole”
administrative record—i.e., whether and to what extent an administrative record
should include internal documents. In what follows, I address each issue, arguing at
both turns that the expansive approach to the record rule better enables the

156. See cases cited supra, note 122; Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161, 1181
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d in part, and rev’d in part, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982).
157. See cases cited supra note 16.
158. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 406 (1971).
159. Id. at 420.
160. Of course, in some cases an agency action will be arbitrary and capricious because of the
agency’s failure to account for an important aspect of the problem at issue. Much of the time, the
administrative record properly constructed will contain the evidence of such a failing. For example,
where a public comment raises an important issue that the agency fails to address, that comment is
appropriately part of the record because it was at some point considered by the agency. In more
uncommon circumstances, where the agency failed to even consider an important issue,
supplementation, not completion, of the record is the appropriate course.
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reviewing court to engage in meaningful judicial review under the arbitrary and
capricious standard.
1. Materials before whom?
Put simply, an administrative record for informal agency action must include
materials considered by all agency personnel involved in the decision-making
process—not just the ultimate decisionmaker—because this is the only way to
capture the intricacy of modern administrative decision-making, which is the
product of complex bureaucratic institutions.161 This position is not particularly
controversial—lower courts, even if they apply a narrow approach to the record
rule in another respect, today generally agree that an administrative record should
include materials considered by any agency personnel involved in the
decision-making process.162 But the issue is worth addressing in light of the Trump
Administration’s recent insistence, in the DACA litigation and Department of
Commerce, that an administrative record should be limited to only those materials
directly considered by the ultimate decisionmaker.163
Including indirectly considered materials reflects the reality that limiting
judicial review to only those materials directly considered by the ultimate
decisionmaker would render the administrative record a “fictional account of the
actual decisionmaking process.”164 Take, for example, the Department of the
Interior, which employs over 70,000 people across nine bureaus and countless
offices under the Secretary.165 One such bureau is the Bureau of Land Management,
headed by a Director charged with permitting authority over an array of uses of
federal land, such as rights-of-way for pipelines, railroads, or highways.166 Approval
of these projects frequently requires the preparation of an environmental
assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et
seq. (2012) (NEPA), which the agency must take into account during the approval
process.167 These reports can span thousands of pages.168 No one seriously suggests
the ultimate decisionmaker has read these thousands of pages—rather, it is accepted
that the decisionmaker relied on summaries prepared by subordinate staff or as part
of the assessment itself. But nor does anyone seriously suggest that these whole
161. See Saul, supra note 88.
162. See sources cited supra note 117. But see Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161, 1181
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d in part, and rev’d in part, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982); McMillan & Peterson, supra
note 122, at 342.
163. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211 WHA, 2017
WL 4642324 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017).
164. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
165. Bureaus, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/bureaus [ https://perma.cc/
QUY7-XKTS ] ( last visited Feb. 10, 2020 ); Interior Offices, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/
bureaus/offices [ https://perma.cc/UZM3-AJ6K ] ( l ast visited Feb. 10, 2020 ).
166. See generally Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782
(2012) (“FLPMA”); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012) (“NEPA”).
167. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2014).
168. See id.
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environmental assessments should not be in the record. Indeed, the underlying
report is necessary to test the accuracy of the summary and/or the reasonableness
of the ultimate decision.
Limiting judicial review to only those materials considered directly to the
agency decisionmaker would hobble arbitrary and capricious review. A construction
of the record rule limiting judicial review to only those materials directly considered
by the ultimate decisionmaker would create a gaping loophole for agencies to exploit
by having subordinates submit only those materials supporting a favored course of
action regardless of the contrary evidence. This would fundamentally undermine
the concept of reasoned decision-making by turning agency action into an exercise
in cherry-picking favorable evidence for presentation to the reviewing court. That
possibility is inconsistent with Overton Park itself, which rejected the Secretary’s
proffering of evidence favorable to his position at trial, calling instead for a review
of all the evidence before the Secretary and implicitly rejecting any interpretation
that would allow the Secretary to proffer only that material favorable to his position
from that universe of materials.169 A record that is only those materials that support
the agency action is in no sense the “whole record,” and courts have strongly
rejected a construction of the record rule that would allow an agency to unilaterally
decide the contents of an administrative record.170 Limiting judicial review to only
those materials considered by the agency decisionmaker would functionally allow
just that and thus cannot be correct.
2. Should an administrative record include internal documents?
The more controversial question is: which of those materials considered by
agency personnel involved in the decision-making process are properly part of the
administrative record? The narrow approach would categorically exclude most
internal documents, functionally limiting judicial review to external sources
consulted by the agency. The expansive approach categorically includes internal
materials—emails, letters, memoranda, opinions, meeting notes, and the
like—subject to a justified assertion of privilege. As I will explain, the expansive
approach is desirable because it ensures materials directly relevant to the arbitrary
and capricious decision-making inquiry will be made available to the reviewing
court. The narrow construction is inappropriate because it categorically excludes
documents relevant to the arbitrary and capricious inquiry.
As discussed in Part I, agencies can fail arbitrary and capricious review in a
variety of ways, including by offering post-hoc and pretextual rationalizations to
justify the action in question, failing to consider important aspects of the problem

169. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).
170. See, e.g., Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739 (10th Cir. 1993); see Saul, supra note
88; Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Requirement of Judicial Review “On the
Record,” 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 179, 222 (1996).
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addressed, or relying on improper factors deciding whether and how to act.171 A
review of the case law demonstrates that internal materials are regularly relevant to
that inquiry—validating the expansive approach, which better ensures such
materials are part of the administrative record so that the reviewing court can engage
in its “substantial inquiry” into whether the agency action at issue was the product
of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.172
A few examples illustrate the relevance and significance of internal documents
to arbitrary and capricious review. Department of Commerce is itself an example of the
role internal documents can play in arbitrary and capricious review.173 In Department
of Commerce, emails between Secretary Ross and subordinate officials were evidence
that the explanation provided for adding the 2020 Census citizenship question was
a pretextual rationalization rendering the action arbitrary and capricious.174 Secretary
Ross had contended that the decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020
Census was prompted by a December 2017 request to do so by the Department of
Justice.175 But internal emails between the Secretary and other officials
demonstrated that Commerce had prompted Justice to draft and send the request
so that Commerce would have a reason for adding the question.176 Those emails
indicated Commerce had been seeking such a request from other agencies but had
been denied and repeatedly referenced the Secretary’s frustration that the question
was taking so long to be added.177 Although the Supreme Court based its
affirmation of this portion of the decision on the whole record, including
extra-record discovery, after finding it warranted (if untimely),178 Judge Alsup
specifically based his conclusion that the addition of a citizenship question violated
the APA and was arbitrary and capricious on the administrative record alone,
demonstrating the importance of those internal documents.179
In another example, Earth Island Institute, the Ninth Circuit invalidated as
arbitrary and capricious another Department of Commerce action finding that
purse seine tuna fishing180 had no significant adverse impact on dolphin

171. See, e.g., Bar MK Ranches, 994 F.2d at 739; see Saul, supra note 88; Young, supra note 170.
172. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Gutierrez, No. C 01-0421 JL, 2008 WL 11358008, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2008).
173. The DACA litigation may likewise prove an example, but remains on appeal at the motion
to dismiss stage and so the lower court is yet to apply arbitrary and capricious review to the
underlying record.
174. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also
State v. Ross, 358 F. Supp. 3d 965, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
175. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 660–62.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, No. 18-966, slip op. at 25–26 (S. Ct. June 27, 2019).
179. Judge Alsup then bolstered the conclusion with extra-record evidence. Dep’t of Commerce,
351 F. Supp. 3d at 661.
180. Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123 (2007). Tuna will sometimes swim under
dolphin pods—purse seine fishing involves encircling the tuna and dolphin with the aim of harvesting
the tuna and releasing the dolphins. Id. at 1126–27.
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populations.181 Congress had delegated the inquiry to Commerce, requiring it to
collaborate with other agencies and review the best available science to make the
finding, which would trigger certain labeling requirements.182 Specifically, a finding
of no adverse impact would allow tuna caught using the method to be labeled as
“dolphin-safe,” which had significant economic implications for producers.183 The
Ninth Circuit relied on various internal materials to find that the policy was the
result of improper political and foreign affairs concerns—“factors Congress had
not intended it to consider”—and therefore arbitrary and capricious.184 Those
materials included: (1) an internal memorandum and briefing materials referencing
the government of Mexico’s desire to have tuna caught with the method labeled as
“dolphin-safe”; (2) various internal communications regarding the foreign policy
issues related to the labeling; (3) changing drafts of internal memoranda around the
time of the most significant political pressures, which retreated from claims that the
available data did not support a finding of no adverse impact, emphasizing foreign
policy issues instead.185
Similarly, in Native Village of Point Hope v. Jewell, the Ninth Circuit invalidated
an environmental assessment as arbitrary and capricious, relying on internal emails
to do so.186 The case involved an environmental assessment conducted by the
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) in the
process of approving oil and gas development leases off the coast of Alaska.187
Under NEPA, the agency was required to consider various alternatives discussed in
the environmental assessment before making the decision to lease (or how much to
lease).188 The BOEM recommended the Interior choose the more expansive leasing
option based on environmental data premised on an estimate that in the event oil
and gas development occurred, one billion barrels of oil would become
economically recoverable.189 However, internal emails revealed that the one billion
barrel estimate was chosen without an adequate scientific basis and was, as one

181. Id. at 1128.
182. Id. at 1127.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1129, 1134–35; see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1983). It is perhaps not a surprise that a number of the cases
referenced herein involve a degree of political intrigue. For a discussion of the appropriate place for
political concerns in arbitrary and capricious review, see generally Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place
for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009).
185. Earth Island Inst., 484 F.3d at 1129, 1134–35. The lower court relied on internal
documents to find Commerce’s “no adverse impact” finding arbitrary and capricious for another
reason. Specifically, it relied in part on an internal email raising concerns regarding the reliability of
certain relevant data to find that the agency failed to rely on the “best available science” as required by
the statutory scheme. Earth Island Inst. v. Evans, 26 I.T.R.D. 1993, *22 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d as
modified sub nom. Earth Island Inst., 484 F.3d 1123. The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s
conclusion but did not reference the same internal documents. Earth Island Inst., 484 F.3d at 1131.
186. Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489, 503–05 (9th Cir. 2014).
187. Id. at 492.
188. Id. at 492–94.
189. Id.
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agency scientist wrote, “entirely speculative,” and up to twelve billion gallons of oil
could have been economically recoverable if prices remained steady.190 The court
thus found the assessment arbitrary and capricious, remanding to the agency for
further consideration using a reasoned estimate for the amount of oil likely to
become economically recoverable.191
Critically, a narrow construction of the record rule would have categorically
excluded the crucial evidence in Department of Commerce, Point Hope, and Earth
Island, and the various other cases decided based on internal documents,192 from
the administrative record.193 This would place an extremely high burden on the
plaintiff, who would have to argue for supplementation of the record under the
extremely narrow exceptions to the record rule that warrant supplementation,
drastically reducing the likelihood that the relevant material is available to the
reviewing court. Thus, the expansive construction of the record rule is desirable
because it better ensures internal materials relevant to the arbitrary and capricious
inquiry are a part of the administrative record.
B. The Record Rule and Principles of Administrative Law
The expansive construction of the record rule for informal agency action also
comports with the principles of administrative law at the heart of the APA. Broadly
speaking, the APA represented a compromise between New Dealers, who called for
a dramatically expanded role for administrative agencies in American government,
and critics (including the American Bar Association) who were skeptical of the
unchecked power agencies would enjoy under such a system.194 New Dealers
justified their vision of the bureaucracy in terms of the need for expertise and
flexibility: the modern world required complex solutions to new problems that
required technical expertise and the ability to exercise flexible discretion that
Congress lacked.195 Critics argued that administrative bureaucrats were politically
unaccountable, insofar as they are not elected directly, and that, if unchecked, such

190. Id. at 499–505.
191. Id. at 505.
192. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 638 F.2d 994, 1000–04 (7th Cir. 1980);
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 372–73 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (relying on
internal emails to find environmental assessment arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider relevant
data); Wash. Toxics Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Fish & Wildlife Serv., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1158,
1187–94 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (relying on internal correspondence conveying criticism of agency’s
approach to find environmental assessment arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider
relevant data).
193. See generally Harris, supra note 154 at 393–409. Much of Harris’s argument that unwarranted
assertions of privilege frustrate arbitrary and capricious review supports my broader contention that
deliberative, yet non-privileged documents must be made part of the administrative record for judicial
review to be meaningful.
194. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 34–38
(Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017); Harris, supra note 154, at 373–81 (2009); see generally Robert
L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1267 (1986).
195. See Harris, supra note 154, at 352.
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a system would veil bureaucratic decision-making, rendering any indirect
accountability through election of the president ineffective.196 Years of discussion
on the matter resulted in the APA,197 which “sets forth the procedures by which
federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions subject to review by
the courts.”198 Under this system, federal administrative agencies enjoyed the broad
discretion necessary to address complex modern issues, but were held accountable
through procedural requirements and judicial review that ensured their actions were
truly the result of an application of their expertise.199
The expansive construction of the record rule as applied to informal agency
action comports with this history. First, the expansive construction serves to ensure
agency action is, in fact, the product of agency expertise. Including internal
documents such as memos, emails, drafts, meeting notes, etc. paints the most
accurate picture possible of what motivated the agency’s decision, the factors it
considered, and the analysis that went in to the ultimate decision. Where informal
action at issue is the product of reasoned decision-making that applies agency
expertise, an expansive administrative record will show so and serve to support the
action. Where it is not, an expansive administrative record will demonstrate the
agency failed to apply its expertise. In such cases, the justifications for agency
discretion and flexibility are undermined and are to be corrected by judicial review.
Critically, the result is not to foreclose the course of action, but to remand to the
agency for further consideration. This ensures that the agency’s chosen course of
action is not permanently foreclosed, but that if and when it is adopted it is adopted
because it comports with the agency’s expertise and reasoned decision-making.
Second, an expansive administrative record ensures agency officials and the
Presidential Administrations they serve remain accountable to the public. An
expansive administrative record provides the public with the most accurate picture
of the agency’s decision-making, unveiling the agency’s policy motivations and its
assessment of the issues. Where the administrative record reveals the agency’s
decision is based on unpersuasive or unpopular reasoning, then the public can and
should hold the agency accountable through the President even if the court does
not invalidate the policy as arbitrary and capricious.200 But this accountability
mechanism is undermined where the record rule is interpreted to allow the agency
to present only favorable evidence or the most convenient rationales that shield its
decision-making from public scrutiny. Various statutes involving administrative
actions acknowledge the value inherent in agencies “showing their work,” even if

196. See id.
197. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950) (“The Act thus represents a long
period of study and strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula
upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.”).
198. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2018).
199. See Harris, supra note 154, at 352–53.
200. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
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doing so may not change the ultimate decision. NEPA, for example “ensures that
the agency will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental
concerns in its decisionmaking process.”201 The disclosure may not change the
ultimate action, but it does allow the public to hold an administration accountable
for policy choices with damaging environmental consequences, or policy choices
that place an unpopular environmental burden on commercial interests.
As the D.C. Circuit remarked in analyzing the record rule: “Private parties and
reviewing courts alike have a strong interest in fully knowing the basis and
circumstances of an agency’s decision. The process by which the decision has been
reached is often mysterious enough without the agency’s maintaining unnecessary
secrecy.”202 The DACA litigation presents a case in point. There, DHS’s first
certified record told a brief story about the rescission of a program it believed
contrary to the governing law, a reasonably benign rationale.203 But the expansive
record seems likely to expose a more complex, and more controversial reasoning
related to the current administration’s broader immigration policies. An expansive
approach to the record rule ultimately may not preclude the administration from
rescinding DACA. But it would ensure the administration’s basis for rescinding the
program are publicly acknowledged such that the public can hold the administration
accountable for its choice in the forthcoming election.204
C. Addressing Common Arguments Against an Expansive Record Rule
Courts and commentators justify a narrow approach to the record rule in two
ways: a narrow construction, the reasoning goes, (1) is more efficient, for agencies
and reviewing courts; and (2) prevents judicial overreach beyond what is called for
by arbitrary and capricious review.205 But these arguments overstate the impact
wider adoption of an expansive approach to the record rule would have. Moreover,
and perhaps more importantly, any limited impact is a worthwhile tradeoff for
effective judicial review and the assurance agency action is the product of
agency expertise.
Efficiency concerns related to the expansive record rule are easily addressed
or overblown. First, an expansive record rule is a reasonably bright line for courts
201. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
202. Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
203. See In re United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138
S. Ct. 443 (2017).
204. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 498–99 (9th
Cir. 2018) (“But public accountability for agency action can only be achieved if the electorate knows
how to apportion the praise for good measures and the blame for bad ones. Without knowing the true
source of an objectionable agency action, ‘the public cannot “determine on whom the blame or the
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures ought really to fall.”’ In
then-Professor Kagan’s words, ‘the degree to which the public can understand the sources and levers
of bureaucratic action’ is ‘a fundamental precondition of accountability in administration.’”).
205. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc); see, e.g., Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 69–71 (efficiency).

First to Printer_Alter.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

A RECORD OF WHAT?

3/30/20 4:15 PM

1075

and litigants to apply and so wider adoption would result in more complete
administrative records filed in the first instance, reducing the needs for courts to
attend to motions to complete or supplement the record and narrowing the scope
of such motions where they do come. True, the expansive approach would result in
larger administrative records. But any burden on the courts can be resolved with
reference to the APA itself, which allows for review of the “whole record or those
parts of it cited by a party.”206 Where the administrative record is particularly large,
the reviewing court is free to rely solely on those parts of the record cited by the
parties, limiting the strain on the reviewing court. Moreover, agencies, courts, and
litigants already navigate expansive records in a variety of contexts, as Justice Breyer
recognized in his DACA dissent, such that any increased burden on the agency is
speculative in light of existing procedures to deal with large records.207 In an age of
electronic record-keeping, an agency need only conduct an electronic search for
relevant documents and supplement that search with the more traditional gathering
of documents that only exist in a hard copy. Indeed, the infrastructure for such a
process already exists given agencies’ obligations to comply with FOIA requests.208
As for concerns over judicial overreach, those fail to justify the gross
overbreadth of a narrow construction of the record rule. Generally, these arguments
assert that a narrow construction of the record rule is necessary to prevent the
reviewing court from (1) replacing the agency’s expert policy choice with a policy
choice preferred by the reviewing court; or (2) improperly inquiring into the mental
processes of the agency decisionmaker.209 The first concern grants federal courts
little respect. Even those lower courts that have applied an expansive construction
of the record rule have properly limited their orders to those materials considered
by the agency personnel.210 Moreover, those courts have been careful to clarify that
their review was limited solely to the agency’s decision-making, not the merits of
the underlying decision.211 There is little evidence that judicial overreach occurs,
whatever the scope of the administrative record in question, and the Supreme Court
as currently constituted would be sure to correct such an overreach.
The second contends that internal documents are properly excluded from an
administrative record because review of such materials would involve an
206. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
207. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 374–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. There is some question about how ingenuous these claims of burden on the agency truly
are, given that administrative records already reach significant lengths. See In re United States, 138
S. Ct. at 374 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Government complains that it must review 21,000 documents
as potentially part of the administrative record. But . . . that is by no means an unusually large number
of documents; administrative records often contain hundreds of thousands of documents.”).
209. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc); see, e.g., Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts
to Limit the Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 (1984).
210. See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 518, 660–61
(S.D.N.Y. 2019); see Young, supra note 170 (refuting the claim that courts regularly or inappropriately
look beyond the administrative record).
211. See, e.g., Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 518, 660–61; Young, supra note 170.
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impermissible inquiry into the thought process of the decisionmaker, or are subject
to deliberative process privilege.212 True, Overton Park compels a reviewing court to
avoid inquiries into the mental processes of the agency decisionmaker outside of a
narrow set of circumstances.213 But the case law suggests that this rule is properly
limited to precluding literal transcripts of internal deliberations in addition to the
depositions that were the Court’s focus in Overton Park.214 Moreover, as Justice
Breyer emphasized in commenting on Judge Alsup’s expansive order to complete
the record in the DACA litigation: “At least facially, these [internal] documents do
not seem to involve ‘inquiry into the mental processes’ of the decisionmaker at
all.”215 Similarly, the deliberative process privilege appears to apply
narrowly—certainly, it did not preclude consideration of the relevant documents in
Department of Commerce.216 To the extent it applies at all,
it will normally be far easier for the agency to establish its interest in
suppressing such documents than for the private litigants to establish their
interest in exposing them to judicial scrutiny. The proper approach,
therefore, would appear to be to consider any document that might have
influenced the agency’s decision to be “evidence” . . . but subject to any
privilege that the agency properly claims as protecting its interest in
non-disclosure.217
Given the narrow scope of materials that might reflect the decisionmaker’s
mental processes and the breadth of internal materials directly relevant to the
arbitrary and capricious inquiry, the narrow construction of the record rule is
inappropriately overbroad.
In sum, the expansive construction of the record rule illustrated by Department
of Commerce and the DACA litigation is correct because it best enables a reviewing
court to engage in the “thorough, probing, in-depth” arbitrary and capricious review
of informal agency action mandated by the APA.218 The narrow construction is
inappropriate because it would categorically exclude relevant material, undermining

212. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 35–42.
213. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402,
420 (1971).
214. See In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 372 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, we also
said in Overton Park . . . that ‘inquiry into the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers is
usually to be avoided’ absent a showing of bad faith or improper conduct. But we said that in the
context of explaining the circumstances under which officials ‘who participated in the decision’ could
be required ‘to give testimony explaining their action.’”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); In re
United States, 875 F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Portland Audubon Soc’y, 984 F.2d at 1549);
Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1549 (9th Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 789 F.2d 26
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc)); S.F. Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
No. 16-cv-05420-RS( JCS), 2018 WL 3846002, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2018).
215. In re United States, 138 S. Ct. at 373 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
216. See Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 547–72, 660–61.
217. Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
218. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
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judicial review of the agency’s decision-making process. Nor do concerns of judicial
overreach and efficiency—which are speculative and easily addressed by the text of
the APA—justify the narrow construction.
CONCLUSION
Fairly or unfairly, administrative law bears a reputation for being a bit
tedious—boring, even.219 Perhaps that reputation is unavoidable given
administrative law’s association with the nuances of obscure product labeling
regulations and its various procedural intricacies.220 But as any first-year Civil
Procedure professor worth their salt would say: “Procedure affects substance.” And
when it comes to administrative law, the procedure affects the array of substantive
areas federal agencies engage with: from immigration and healthcare, to
employment and the environment. Thus, it would be a critical error for those
involved in the myriad substantive fields touched by federal agencies to shy away
from the procedural nuances of administrative law.
With this Note, I have attempted to shed some light on the impact one of
those procedural nuances—the composition of an administrative record for
informal agency action—can have. Tedious or not (hopefully the latter so far as this
Note is concerned), the issue can be of critical importance to parties litigating issues
of national importance, as the DACA litigation and Department of Commerce illustrate.
In shedding light on the issue, I have done my best to explain why an expansive
approach to the record rule, which would have an administrative record of informal
agency action include materials considered by any agency personnel involved in the
decision-making process and categorically includes internal materials, is the
desirable approach. First because it best enables a reviewing court to assess an
agency’s decision-making under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious review, and
second because it comports with the principles of administrative law the APA was
designed to serve.221 The application of an expansive record rule ensures the
ultimate decisions made by an agency are the product of reasoned decision-making
and agency expertise, not the whims of political pressure, something more
nefarious, or just plain laziness.
219. See, e.g., The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989) (“[T]he subject of this lecture series is administrative law . . . so you
should lean back, clutch the sides of your chairs, and steel yourselves for a pretty dull lecture.”); William
Funk, My Ideal “Casebook” or What’s Wrong with Administrative Law Legal Education and How to Fix
It, in A Nutshell (So to Speak), 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 247, 247 (2000) (“Administrative Law, the course, is
commonly perceived as boring, technical, abstruse, not ‘real.’”).
220. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1126 (2007).
221. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014) (“[I]nterpret the relevant words
not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, structure . . . and purpose.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Of course, “[r]eliance on context and structure in statutory interpretation is
a ‘subtle business, calling for great wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering becomes creation
and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation itself.’” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,
2495–96 (2015) (quoting Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939)). But without definitive text
or legislative history, context is the best available medium.
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The expansive construction to the record rule has gained some momentum in
the lower courts. But implementation of the expansive record rule thus far has been
a piece-meal process, gaining traction only with its adoption in a few district courts
in each successive opinion. Without some sort of intervention, it seems unlikely the
expansive construction will be adopted uniformly. The question then, is what might
be done to facilitate wider adoption of the record rule. The Supreme Court, as
currently constituted, is unlikely to hold in favor of the rule, given its skepticism of
Judge Alsup’s order in the DACA litigation. Legislative action is a more interesting
proposition. Those on the right have espoused a profound skepticism in the leeway
informal agency action enjoys and thus might be interested in clarifying the “whole
record” requirement with an amendment of the APA.222 Those on the left, seeing
what the Trump Administration has done with informal agency action, might also
be inclined to seek a more expansive reading of the record rule, perhaps having faith
that officials under their own administrations might be more faithful to the APA’s
reasoned decision-making mandate. Perhaps that would be enough to overcome the
legislative lethargy so characteristic of our modern Congress. Outside of those
options, local rules might serve to speed the adoption of an expansive approach to
the record rule.223
Agency action, especial informal agency action, operates in the shadows of
modern American life. But “[s]ecrecy, whether intentional or otherwise, is
inconsistent ‘with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process and with
the ideals of reasoned decision-making on the merits which undergirds all our
administrative law.’”224 The broader adoption of an expansive construction of the
record rule would serve to unveil the processes by which administrative agencies
make decisions, big and small, assuring courts can hold agencies accountable where
those decisions are not the product of reasoned decision-making, and the public can
hold agencies accountable where those decisions are unpopular but within the
agency’s discretion. The procedural nuances of the issue might be tedious, but the
consequences are anything but.

222. See, e.g., Attorney General Jeff Sessions Ends the Department’s Practice of Regulation by
Guidance, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeffsessions-ends-department-s-practice-regulation-guidance [ https://perma.cc/9WAD-HSZL ].
223. Gavoor & Platt argue for this approach as a potential medium for ensuring the uniform
application of a narrower record rule. See Gavoor & Platt, supra note 13, at 6.
224. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 638 F.2d 994, 1004 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting Home
Box Office, Inc. v. F.C.C., 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 111).

